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Introduction 
I have been told that David Hilbert, one of the greatest mathematicians of the 
twentieth century, is buried right here in Göttingen. Apparently, on his tombstone there 
is an inscription drawn from the last sentence of a speech that he broadcast from his 
hometown of Königsberg on 8 September 1930.1 It reads: Wir müssen wissen—wir werden 
wissen!2 This exhortation recalls the final word of a similar lecture delivered forty-eight 
years earlier by the physiologist and philosopher Emil du Bois-Reymond. Speaking in 
Leipzig to the 45th plenary session of the Society of German Scientists and Physicians, du 
                                                
1 http://topo.math.u-psud.fr/~lcs/Hilbert/HlbrtKD.htm 
2 “We must know—we will know!” 
Gabriel Finkelstein©2002 draft copy  
 
2
Bois-Reymond broached the topic “Of the Limits of Natural Knowledge” and declared, 
at least with respect to the riddle of consciousness, Ignorabimus—we will never know.3 
I bring up these famous pronouncements because they set the stage for my remarks 
today. On the one hand, we have du Bois-Reymond’s doubt that science will be able to 
address the most important questions of existence. On the other hand, we have Hilbert’s 
belief that the methods of science are the only means of ever obtaining those answers. 
The subject of my present talk, the mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose, has sided 
with Hilbert on this issue. I would like to suggest that Penrose’s current position on the 
nature of consciousness makes most sense in the context of this long-standing debate on 
the limits of science, and what is more, the even longer-standing debate between science 
and religion. 
But first let us first turn to Penrose’s argument. 
 
Gödel, Turing, and the Non-Computability of Mathematical Reasoning 
In 1905, following the lead of du Bois-Reymond, Hilbert identified twenty-three 
unsolved problems in mathematics.4 By 1928 he expanded the tenth in this list to what he 
termed the Entscheidungsproblem: Is there a general formal procedure, or algorithm, by 
which mathematicians can determine if their assertions are true? Answers to Hilbert’s 
question soon arrived. In 1931 Kurt Gödel proved that all consistent axiomatic systems 
must be incomplete. Five years later Alan Turing demonstrated that some mathematical 
questions can never be decided by calculation. Hilbert’s hopes of finding a formal 
foundation to mathematics seem to have foundered. 
                                                
3 Emi du Bois-Reymond, “Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens” (14 August 1872), in Reden, 2nd edn., 2 
vols. (Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp., 1912), 1: 441-473.  
4 http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/hilbert/problems.html 
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Jump to 1961. The formal device Turing imagined as trying to solve Hilbert’s 
Entscheidungsproblem now exists: it’s called a computer. Reflecting on the difference 
between men and machines, the Oxford philosopher John Lucas borrows Gödel’s proof 
to argue that consciousness can never be modeled by algorithms. He meets with several 
potent criticisms. There the matter lies more or less dormant until 1989, when Roger 
Penrose revisits Lucas’s argument in The Emperor’s New Mind, a popular survey of his 
contentions with artificial intelligence, quantum mechanics, and theories of 
consciousness.5 Five years later Penrose publishes a sequel, Shadows of the Mind, which 
consists largely of responses to criticism of his argument.6 His third, highly derivative 
summary appears in 1997.7 Today Penrose continues to debate his position in a variety of 
scholarly and popular journals.8 
Let me now attempt an epitome of Penrose’s thesis. Although I have an 
undergraduate degree in physics, I found much of Penrose’s discussion tough going. He 
has a broad and deep knowledge of science and mathematics, and even his popular 
writings treat technical issues of computability theory, Mandelbrot sets, quasi-periodic 
tilings, special and general relativity, quantum mechanics, cosmology, and neuroscience. I 
am expert in none of these areas; in fact, it took me more than three weeks of immersion 
in his work to make sense of his position. I think I understand it pretty well now, but if 
there are any physicists or logicians in the audience horrified at the hash I’m about to 
make of my subject, I beg your forbearance. On the other hand, if my summary sounds 
                                                
5 The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University, 
1989). 
6 Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University, 1994).  
7 Roger Penrose, Abner Shimony, Nancy Cartwright, and Stephen Hawking, The Large, the Small, and the 
Human Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997).  
8 Roger Penrose, “Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow: A Reply to Commentaries on Shadows of the Mind,” 
Psyche 2.23 (January 1996); Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, “What ‘Gaps’? Reply to Grush and 
Churchland,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995): 99-112.  
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like utter gibberish to you, I recommend that you just nod and smile through this part of 
the talk. I promise to return to history in the conclusion, and nodding and smiling has 
always worked for me. 
Here, in extremely abbreviated form, is why Penrose thinks we need a new theory of 
physics: 
1. Consciousness cannot be modeled by any formal, consistent system. It therefore 
must be nonalgorithmic. 
2. Consciousness is a reality that deserves scientific explanation. 
3. No current theory of physics, not even quantum mechanics, is nonalgorithmic. 
4. Therefore, a new physical theory of quantum gravity is needed to explain the 
action of the mind. 
Let me now expand on each of these points. The first one, which treats the 
nonalgorithmicity of the mind, forms the foundation for Penrose’s whole argument. 
Accordingly, he devotes over half of his first book to proving it. It goes something like this: 
1a. Assume that my powers of mathematical reasoning can be captured by some 
formal system F—say the algorithms of a computer. 
1b. Within this formal system F I can find a knowably sound algorithm for doing 
mathematics. I’ll call this algorithm the “Gödel sentence” G(F). To give an idea of 
what this Gödel sentence looks like, let me just say for now that it resembles the 
following sentence: This sentence cannot be proven. 
1c. Now, I know the Gödel sentence G(F) to be true. Still, I cannot show this fact 
within my formal system, due to G(F)’s peculiar recursive nature. 
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1d. Furthermore, if I expand my formal system F to include G(F) as an axiom, this 
larger formal system—let’s call it F*—has its own true but undecidable Gödel 
sentence G(F*). 
1e. Therefore, my powers of mathematical reasoning cannot be captured by F, F*, or 
any arbitrarily large formal system of algorithms. 
1f. Therefore, I am not a computer. 
Now, obviously Penrose’s proof is far more detailed than this. If you have any interest 
in it, you can pick up from me at the end of this talk a short handout that goes through 
the details. I used the simplest version I could find that still preserves Penrose’s rigor.9 But 
I think even this brief exposition conveys the gist of this part of his argument. 
Let’s now consider Penrose’s second point, namely, that consciousness is a reality that 
deserves scientific explanation. Here Penrose does not mention much more than his 
unwillingness to consider the alternative. It may well be, as du Bois-Reymond suggested, 
that no theory of science will ever explain the mind, but this is not a possibility that 
Penrose wishes to entertain. To him it smacks of mysticism. Nevertheless, Penrose finds 
contemporary physical theory unsatisfactory. Several deficiencies spring to his mind. 
First, the two greatest achievements in twentieth century physics, general relativity and 
quantum mechanics, are incommensurable. Each has withstood all challenge 
individually, but they cannot both be true. Second, no physical theory, not even the 
standard explanations given in statistical mechanics, can explain the second law of 
thermodynamics, which states that the entropy of the cosmos is increasing. In other 
                                                
9 To me the best summaries and critiques are Daryl McCullough, “Can Humans Escape Gödel? A Review 
of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose,” Psyche 2.4 (April 1995); David J. Chalmers, “Minds, Machines, 
and Mathematics: A Review of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose,” Psyche 2.9 (June 1995); Rick Grush 
and Patricia Smith Churchland, “Gaps in Penrose’s Toilings,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2.1(1995): 10-
29; Geoffrey LaForte, Patrick J. Hayes, Kenneth M. Ford, “Why Gödel’s Theorem Cannot Refute 
Computationalism,” Artificial Intelligence 104 (1998): 265-286. 
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words, we do not understand why time runs in one direction. Finally, no full account 
exists for the reduction of the state vector, or collapse of the wave function, in the 
measurement of quantum events. Several interpretations have been proposed, but each 
leads to what Penrose terms “puzzles” and “paradoxes.” After all, a fully scientific model 
of nature would have to incorporate the fact of consciousness.10 
Penrose develops this last point at briefly in his first book and at greater length in 
Shadows of the Mind. This is where he becomes most speculative, replacing one mystery—
consciousness—with two: quantum gravity and neural microtubules. His reasoning goes a 
little like this: 
4a. The mind must have a means of interacting with matter. 
4b. This process must be both nonalgorithmic (to avoid Gödel’s pitfalls) and 
determinist (to avoid reducing thought to magic). 
4c. A correct theory of quantum gravity could provide a determinist, nonalgorithmic 
account of this mind/body interaction. 
4d. Such an interaction would have to take place in the brain in structures small 
enough to preserve quantum effects. 
4e. Microtubles within neurons serve as a possible site for this to occur. 
 
Criticism of Penrose’s Thesis 
As you may well imagine Penrose has received his fair share of criticism. Most 
objections to his thesis fall into four camps. These could be classified under the rubrics 
                                                
10 More discussion of these issues can be found in Euan J. Squires, Conscious Mind in the Physical World 
(Bristol; New York: Hilger, 1990); Henry P. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1993). 
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Logical, Physical, Biological, and Philosophical. I wish to suggest a fifth rubric of my own: 
Historical. But first, let me try to work through the contemporary polemic. 
Logical. This might be summed up as “Penrose has misunderstood Gödel.” Some of 
the arguments made here go right over my head. But basically, they all seem to come 
back to one central point: Gödel proved that no consistent formalism is complete. So either 
Penrose’s argument is incomplete, in which case it is false, or it is inconsistent, in which 
case it is equivocal. I will return to this point in a minute.11 
Physical. This might be summed up as “Penrose has misunderstood quantum 
mechanics.” Most criticism focuses on Penrose’s view that a correct theory of quantum 
gravity could account for an “objective reduction” of the wave function. Present theories 
ascribe this decoherence to “interactions with the environment or … fluctuations in the 
topology of spacetime.”12 But, according to Stephen Hawking, 
Roger seems to want neither of these mechanisms. Instead he claims that it occurs 
because of the slight warping of space-time produced by the mass of a small 
object. … That warping will not prevent a Hamiltonian evolution with no 
decoherence or objective reduction. It may be that accepted ideas are wrong but 
Roger has not put forward a detailed theory that would enable us to calculate 
when objective reduction would occur.13 
 
Biological. This might be summed up as “Penrose has misunderstood evolution and 
neuroscience.” Typical critiques point out that natural selection rewards heuristics, not 
proofs, that much of the brain works unconsciously, preconsciously, or emotionally, and 
that quantum processes do not seem to function in organisms. 
Philosophical. This might be summed up as “Penrose has misunderstood consciousness 
and reductionism.” Many philosophers believe that the privacy of consciousness 
                                                
11 My favorite Gödelian objection goes like this: Penrose’s argument for the nonalgorithmicity of thought is 
entirely formal. One could imagine it a planet of intelligent robots making it. 
12 Stephen Hawking, “The Objections of an Unashamed Reductionist,” in The Large, The Small, and the 
Human Mind, op. cit., 169-172, on 170. 
13 Ibid. 
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precludes it from scientific investigation. If we had machines that allowed us to read each 
other’s thoughts, we might be able to experiment on them. But until that time, cognitive 
research remains confined to public phenomena like intelligence. Moreover, there is no 
reason to assume that consciousness will reduce to physics. It may be an entity with its 
own intrinsic qualities, or it may make most sense within the disciplines of psychology and 
physiology. Penrose assumes no explanation to be fully competent until it is freed of 
context and expressed in mathematics.14 
 
Conclusion: Platonism, or the Religion of Science 
Universal, eternal truth has often been equated with God. Penrose equates it with 
mathematics. In fact, he is so certain that mathematics reveals a perfect world that he 
wrote three books justifying this belief. 
The great irony is that Penrose adapted Gödel’s proof to his endeavor. Most logicians 
interpret Gödel’s result as a statement on limitation, one of the latest in a long history of 
failures to find a firm foundation to mathematics. That history leads back to the set theory 
of Whitehead and Russell and Cantor, to the geometry of Riemann and Bolyai and 
Lobachevsky, to the analysis of Weierstrass and Cauchy and Lagrange, all the way to the 
Ancient Greeks. Limitation is old. It is also common. In fact, it could be considered the 
major theme of the twentieth century: in politics, with failures of Hitler and Stalin and 
Mao; in social science, with the rise of complexity and context; in philosophy, with the 
silence of Wittgenstein; in literature, with the novels of Joyce and Proust and Musil; in art, 
with the end of style; in music, with the elision of composition and performance; in 
                                                
14 Nancy Cartwright, “Why Physics?” in The Large, The Small, and the Human Mind, op. cit., 161-168. 
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science and technology, with the loss of public trust; and in medicine; with the 
recrudescence of disease. 
Some time ago Owen Chadwick made the brilliant observation that the first wave of 
secularization in the nineteenth century mirrored the very religion it was attempting to 
replace. Du Bois-Reymond belonged to that first wave. He was born in 1818, the same 
year as Karl Marx, Ivan Turgenev, James Froude, and Frederick Douglass. These 
contemporaries received educations that Flaubert termed sentimental. I suppose that is a 
generous way to speak of lives shaped by disappointment. The thing is, limitation also 
teaches acceptance. This is not a lesson Roger Penrose seems ready to learn. 
